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CASE NOTES
patent monopoly that any exchange of patent rights between two or more
parties may be deemed to be a violation of the antitrust laws. Such a restrictive
view of patent rights, while coming close to abolishing the patent monopoly,
will clearly lead to a curtailment of patent exchanging in industry, when the
apparent effect of the exchange is to benefit both parties to the agreement. This
curtailment of exchangeability may in turn lead to a lessening of competition if
the parties, reluctant to face antitrust suits, refuse to license other parties to
use their developments. Further, this natural progression of conclusions from
recent cases, emphasizing concerted activity, appears to be in direct conflict
with the statutory free assignability of patent rights and the prior precedent
requiring clear evidence of a monopoly, price fixing scheme or other type of
patent abuse before patent transfers would be deemed conspiracies in
restraint of trade. •
ROBERT T. TOBIN
Antitrust—Vertical Division of Markets.—White Motor Co. v. United
Statesil Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission.2—Restric-
tions on the ability to compete are at the heart of antitrust violations.3
These restrictions continue to vary in form, as different in technique as there
are differences in the whole mercantile sphere. Even so, while the form may
generally govern a court's approach to a possible restraint, it is rather the
effect of the restrictive market distribution agreements which should dictate
the response.' This duality in antitrust litigation becomes especially evident
when the court is presented with a sui generis of form; as in the cases here
noted, the two courts confront initially the vertical territory limitation.5 In
the one instance—White Motor—a wholesale manufacturer of trucks, and
the other—Snap-On Tools—a wholesale producer of tool equipment, each
decided that the sound method of marketing its product was the use of
independent distributorships. The independence, however, was less than total
since the truck and the tool retailers each signed a contract limiting their
access to markets by prescribing delineated geographic areas in which a
distributor or retailer could do business. Additionally, there could be no com-
petition with the manufacturer in acquiring certain large accounts, e.g.,
government contracts.
The essential quality of the form of the respective practices was that the
origin of the restraints on market areas came from the manufacturer down to
the distributor. In the instance of White Motor Co., there were also signed
1 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
2 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
3 fAlgreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose
the destruction of competition .. . are injurious to the public interest and void.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Son Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
4 The test of illegality under the Sherman Act is the presence of an unreasonable
restraint without regard to whether the conspiracy is among affiliated parties or those
integrated under common ownership or among those otherwise independent. United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947).
5 The note will treat primarily the geographic restrictions imposed by the manu-
facturer; the restrictions on the classes of customers to be served raise substantially the
same issues.
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reciprocal contracts among the distributors.° The dealers of Snap-On Tools,
however, were not in form contracting with other dealers.? Further, the
limiting effect upon competition was entirely upon the sales of the one brand. 8
Thus, these traits of the form dictated the designation: vertical territory
limitations.
The respective government agency in each case attempted to penetrate
form by contending that the restriction was among potential competitors on
the same level of distribution, despite the origin of the restraint. Hence, while
the arrangement may be limited to the one brand, it is, nevertheless, a division
of markets between competitors.°
When a court does get beyond the form to the content of the restraint,
there is essentially one test applied to judge effect—actual or potential un-
reasonable restraint of competition.l° This is manifested by practices that
"restrict production, raise prices, or otherwise control the market to the detri-
ment of purchasers or consumers. . . . 7711
There are two approaches for determining if such effects do exist: (1)
the totality of surrounding circumstances, including intent, which may indi-
cate the unreasonable nature of the restraint; or (2) the use of precedent to
indicate without need of investigation, the illegality of the practice.r 2 The
former contemplates the use of the Rule of Reason and the complainant must
prove a factual case subject to appropriate defenses." This was the approach
of the FTC in Snap-On Tools Corp." The latter prevents the court from in-
vestigating the reasonableness of the individual restraint, and makes the
agreement a priori void.15 It was in this latter, per se, classification that the
Justice Department attempted to place White Motor Co."
There is already a full catalogue of forms ruled illegal per se and the
Supreme Court was not lacking in varieties with which fo compare this new
variation." Among the most notorious forms of restricting competition is the
6 Mr. Justice Brennan is concerned in his concurring opinion as to who "induced"
the agreements, concluding that if the dealers did so, primarily, the fact that the manu-
facturer imposed them would not save the agreements. Supra note 1, at 267.
7 Mr. Justice Clark's dissent holds that the vertical origin is in reality more destruc-
tive than were the agreements among distributors because of the enforcement by the
manufacturer. Supra note 1, at 279-80.
8 White Motor Co. argues that this enables a more effective inter-brand competition.
Supra note 1, at 256.
0 The Court in White Motor side-steps the restrictions among dealers by considering
the justification for the manufacturer to use these policies even though the restraint is
among the distributors and perhaps it is here that the justification, if any, should be
found.
10 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
11 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
12 Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
13 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
14 The action was brought under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719
(1914), 15 U.S.C. 45 (1958).
is Supra note 12.
16 Justice Department complained under the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15
U.S.C. H 1, 3 (1958).
17 The Supreme Court has considered the following practices to be per se violations:
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vertical price-fixing agreement between manufacturer and retailer. In United
States v. Parke, Davis Co.,' 8 the Court declared illegal per se an attempt by
the manufacturer to eliminate competition among retailers by having its
dealers coordinate efforts in keeping a floor s
 under pricing. The Court found
the crucial element to be the active coordination of manufacturer and retailer
in fulfillment of the restrictive policy. The Parke, Davis case thereby presents
two similarities to the instant case. The source, or vertical origin, was
described in language appropriate to White Motor Co.: "The manufacturer is
thus the organizer of a price-maintenance combination . . . in violation of the
Sherman Act.m° Further, one may inquire whether competition is not more
severely limited by keeping a potential rival completely out of a market area
as it is by eliminating one method of competition, i.e., pricing."
The answer to this is supplied in case law holding territorial divisions of
market among horizontal competitors to be a per se violation of the Sherman
Act 2 1
 The crucial factor in these decisions is the origin of the agreement among
horizontal competitors; such is the form difference from the instant cases."
Where competing firms agree not to compete and instead divide the market
among themselves, this agreement is now considered to have a "pernicious
. . . unredeeming" effect upon competition." The Justice Department urged
an analogy between the White Motor Co. case and Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States.24
 In the latter, the Court declared void per se an arrange-
ment dividing the world into exclusive territories for each of the three parties.
The potential competition was, in fact, over identical products and, further,
the horizontal competitors were part of the same corporate structure. 25
The vertical origin of territorial restrictions is, in its pure form, not
strange in the law. 2° The approval given to certain varieties of restrictive
marketing arrangements of a manufacturer can only be rationalized by the
tying agreements, divisions of markets, group boycotts, and vertical and horizontal price
fixing. Supra note 1, at 258-60.
18 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
13 Mr. Justice Brennan distinguishes the instant case from this by considering vertical
territorial divisions to have only intra brand effects, while vertical price restrictions have
both intra- and inter-brand restraints, Supra note 1, at 268.
2° (Where potential competitors agree not to compete in specified territories)
. . . the consequence is to reduce the number of sellers in each affected market.
Competition among contracting parties is eliminated even more completely than
had they agreed on prices but still did business in the relevant market.
The Att'y Gen.'s Nat. Committee to Study the Anti-Trust Laws (1955) at 26.
21 United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
22 The concern for the vertical vis-a-vis horizontal nature of the arrangement should
not itself be determinative unless there can be shown a distinct effect from the particular
form. See supra note 4.
23 United States v. Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
24 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 	 ,
26 The Court specifically considered this point:
The fact that there is common ownership or control of the contracting corpora-
tions does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 598.
26 Mr. Justice Brennan discusses alternate legitimate methods for achieving vertical
limitations on markets. Supra note 1, at 271, nn. 11, 12.
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general distaste for finding a conspiracy within a corporate structure.27 This
arises from the sine qua non status of conspiracy in a Sherman Act violation
and that one cannot conspire with one's self. In Timken Roller Bearing, the
Court was only incidentally concerned with the corporate structure and looked
beyond to the reality of potential competition. The closer the fact situation
approaches a unitary commercial structure, the less inclined is a court to find
a per se violation, preferring in Such instances to hear the "economic and
business stuff" involved.28
The issue facing the White Motor Court became simply whether here
and now the practice of vertically originated agreements eliminated competi-
tion among dealers and should be banned without a hearing on the peculiar
effects of the arrangement. The Court had a choice between reaching the
conclusion that the contracts, on their faces, had the obvious pernicious effect
upon competition such as to make them illegal per se, or that in each and
every instance a hearing should be held under the "Rule of Reason" ap-
proach." The Supreme Court decided neither, but only concluded that "[w]e
need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrange-
ments on competition to decide whether they ... should be classified as per se
violations."39 In remanding the case for trial, the Court is concerned with
hearing facts, not as to the business justification, but rather as to the effects
on competition, both good and bad.31- It is claimed by the manufacturer that
the chief benefit of the agreement is that it enables the motor truck distrib-
utor to compete more effectively. The strenuous dissent presented by Justice
Clark argues that such a benefit can be realistically characterized as making
"virtue of business necessity."32 If at the trial the business necessity motiva-
tion outweighs the beneficial effect on competition, then precedent would
dictate the necessary result.33
The FTC engaged in just this type of hearing prior to the appeal to the
Seventh Circuit, when it examined the "economic stuff" of the vertical ter-
27 It seems inconceivable to hold per se illegal the selection by the parent of those
persons with whom its subsidiary may or may not deal.
The Att'y Gen.'s Nat. Committee to Study the Anti-Trust Laws, supra note 18, at 35.
23 The Attorney General's Report would apply the "Rule of Reason" to the (acts
of the instant cases. "Exclusive distributorships may be established by a manufacturer as
part of his marketing plan." Id. at 27.
29 In a dissent to the Attorney General's Report, Louis B. Schwartz favoring the
per se approach has the following criticisms of the "Rule of Reason":
I. It makes the proceedings intolerably long and expensive;
2. It operates	 . . in favor of powerful defendants as against smaller units.
since only the powerful can afford that kind of defense.
Id. at 392.
39 Supra note 1, at 253.
37 The policy of the antitrust laws does not depend for its enforcement on the
shown convenience to the parties of a practice against which enforcement is
sought.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
32 Supra note 1, at 278.
33 Once, however, the Court does decide the practice to be per se illegal it would not
matter whether an individual defendant could make a showing that (a) there is business
advantage to the proponent; (b) 'there is a reduction in prices to the consumer; or even
(c) increased competition. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
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ritorial restriction and customer limitations." Since Snap-On Tools was
engaged in other practices found to be contrary to the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, there was a legitimate dispute over whether there should have
been—and was—a separate hearing on territorial restrictions. The court de-
cided that since there was no separate hearing on the merits of territorial
divisions, the court itself could make a finding on the legality of the prac-
tice." Using the findings of the FTC examiner, the court approved of the
agreements, quoting at length the manufacturer's motivation in the matter.
Despite the surface similarities in conclusions, there is a sharp contrast
between the results reached in these cases. White Motor Co. was remanded
for a trial on the facts as to the effect on competition, both good and bad,
from the agreement, and to determine the relation of restraint to business
need (Rule of Reason). The Snap-On Tools Corp. court, however, slides over
the effect on competition, whether absolutely or relative to the business need.
Rather, it is greatly impressed by the advantages to the manufacturer from
the contracts—a defense that will never put a strain on the corporate party
to an antitrust action." Further, the White Motor Co. Court studiously avoids
making a finding as to whether these vertical restraints are per se illegal, but
only concludes that it cannot now decide." The Snap-On Tools Corp. court,
however, uses the decision for precisely what it does not hold—that vertical
restrictions are entirely divorced in the Sherman Act from horizontal re-
straints.88 Finally, the Seventh Circuit, even if justified in its conclusion that
no separate hearing was given with respect to the territorial restrictions, should
have followed the procedure of the Supreme Court and remanded the action
for further hearing rather than reverse the conclusions of the Commission
based not on law, but on facts. It is difficult to conclude as a matter of law
that the evidence is so overwhelming in the case that the Commission made
an incorrect finding of fact.
The matter of vertical agreements not to compete, while bearing strong
resemblance to the past practices, probably was handled by the Supreme
Court in a manner not surprising to the Justice Department." However, the
value of the decision, if read narrowly, seems transient and, while the case
will not be reversed, it is likely to be superseded by a finding on the facts that
34 The Commission judged the contracts to be "a series of agreements having the
effect of eliminating competition among all dealers concerned." Snap-On Tools Corp., 3
Trade Reg. Rep. at II 20,413 (FTC dkt. 7116).
33 While the court is correct on the fact that the territorial and customer limitations
were considered in toto, the Commission's opinion also yields discussion as to the agree-
ments having the "same destructive effects" as illegal horizontal agreements. Certainly
the Commission must have examined the effects before making such a conclusion. Ibid.
36 The Commission considered the business justifications, but decided it to be
". . . clear that the public is entitled to the benefit of competition on the dealer level."
Ibid.
37 "We do not intimate any view on the merits. We only hold that the legality of
the territorial and customer limitations should he determined only after a trial." Supra
note 1, at 264.
38 "[T]he Supreme Court refused to equate a vertical arrangement by a manu-
facturer . . . to a horizontal arrangement among competitors. . . ." Supra note 2, at 831.
33 "[S]ummary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litiga-
tion...." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, at 473 (1962).
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these agreements are, henceforth per se illegal." The Snap-On Tools Corp.
decision will, in such an eventuality, be meaningless as precedent and, in
effect, overruled.
PAUL E. D'HEDOUVILLE
Corporations—Protection of Incumbent Management by the Corporate
Purchase of Its Own Stock—Business Judgment Rule.—Benttett v.
Propp. 1—Plaintiff-appellee brought a minority shareholders' derivative suit
for an accounting, by the chairman and the board of directors of Noma Lites,
Inc., and also for any damages proximately resulting from the allegedly
improper expenditure of corporate funds in the purchase of the company's
own capital stock. The chairman, without authority, had negotiated purchases
of nearly two hundred thousand shares of Noma common stock in response
to a letter, marked "personal and confidential," from Royal Little, the
executive head of Textron, Inc. Therein was requested a list of Noma
shareholders; it was further indicated that Little desired to obtain a con-
trolling interest in Noma. Textron had previously been unsuccessful in its
bid to garner a control interest in American Screw Company, a corporation
in which Noma held 51 per cent of the outstanding stock, and it appeared that
Little might now attempt to succeed by gaining control of Noma itself.
Learning of the stock purchases only one business day before payment was
due, Noma's board ratified the purchases although the financial instability
of the corporation forced them to effect a loan, at one per cent interest per
month, to meet the two million dollar purchase price. The Vice-Chancellor
found the purchases to have been essentially motivated by the chairman's
desire to further personal interests and preserve favored position; he refused
to apply the business judgment rule to the board's resolution in view of the
"precipitate and impulsive manner" in which they reached their decision. 2
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware, it was HELD• the board
was confronted with a fait accompli, which, if left unratified, might well
result in serious financial embarrassment to the corporation. The urgency of
the situation and the nature of the emergency justified the apparent haste
with which the board meeting was conducted as well as the failure to
consider possible alternate avenues of action. The court affirmed the
finding of personal liability as to the chairman!'
The instant case is significant for the insight it may offer into the steps
40 Justice Clark characterized the decision thusly:
Today the Court does a futile act in remanding this case for trial. In my view
appellant cannot plead nor prove an issue upon which a successful defense . . .
can be predicated. Certainly the decision has no precedential value in substantive
anti-trust law.
Supra note 1, at 282-83.
1 — Del. —, 187 A.2d 405 (1962).
2 Propp v. Sadacca, — Del. 	 175 A.2d 33 (Del. Ch. 1961).
3 The court renumerated the accepted Delaware position that the board's resolution
could not legalize the unlawful purchases of the chairman so as to exonerate him from
liability. It only served to "take up the stock to save the corporation from financial
difficulty." Supra note 1, at 411.
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